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AbstrAct
Objective
To establish whether there is any change in mortality 
from infection with a new variant of SARS-CoV-2, 
designated a variant of concern (VOC-202012/1) in 





Community based (pillar 2) covid-19 testing centres 
in the UK using the TaqPath assay (a proxy measure of 
VOC-202012/1 infection).
ParticiPants
54 906 matched pairs of participants who tested 
positive for SARS-CoV-2 in pillar 2 between 1 October 
2020 and 29 January 2021, followed-up until 12 
February 2021. Participants were matched on age, 
sex, ethnicity, index of multiple deprivation, lower tier 
local authority region, and sample date of positive 
specimens, and differed only by detectability of the 
spike protein gene using the TaqPath assay.
Main OutcOMe Measure
Death within 28 days of the first positive SARS-CoV-2 
test result.
results
The mortality hazard ratio associated with infection 
with VOC-202012/1 compared with infection with 
previously circulating variants was 1.64 (95% 
confidence interval 1.32 to 2.04) in patients who 
tested positive for covid-19 in the community. In 
this comparatively low risk group, this represents an 
increase in deaths from 2.5 to 4.1 per 1000 detected 
cases.
cOnclusiOns
The probability that the risk of mortality is increased 
by infection with VOC-202012/01 is high. If this 
finding is generalisable to other populations, 
infection with VOC-202012/1 has the potential to 
cause substantial additional mortality compared 
with previously circulating variants. Healthcare 
capacity planning and national and international 
control policies are all impacted by this finding, with 
increased mortality lending weight to the argument 
that further coordinated and stringent measures are 
justified to reduce deaths from SARS-CoV-2.
Introduction
A new lineage of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (named 
B.1.1.7) was identified from genomic sequencing of 
samples from patients with covid-19 in the south east 
of England in early October 2020. In December 2020, 
Public Health England identified this virus as a variant 
of concern (VOC-202012/1).1 During December this 
new variant spread from the south east to London and 
the rest of the UK, with three quarters of infections 
being attributable to the new variant by 31 December 
2020.2 The UK implemented a second national 
lockdown (5 November to 2 December 2020), which 
coincided with the relative growth of VOC-202012/1. 
After the lockdown, additional control measures were 
implemented as the increased rate of spread of the 
new variant became apparent and was made public.3 
International restrictions on travel from the UK quickly 
followed, in particular to France and to the rest of 
Europe late in December 2020 to curb spread of the 
new variant to other countries, despite evidence that 
it was already present outside the UK. Since then, the 
prevalence of VOC-202012/1 has been observed to be 
increasing in both Europe and the US.4-6
Multiplex target polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
tests used in parts of the UK national testing system 
can distinguish VOC-202012/1 from other SARS-CoV-2 
variants. Testing using the Thermo TaqPath system in 
the UK has shown a close correlation between VOC-
202012/1 cases confirmed by genomic sequencing 
and TaqPath PCR results where the spike protein gene 
PCR target has not been detected but other PCR targets 
(N gene and ORF1ab gene) have been detected.2 7 9 
Such a result is referred to as S gene negative, or S gene 
target failure, and has a strong association to infection 
with the B.1.1.7 variant in the UK. S gene negative 
results have subsequently been used as a proxy to 
track the progression of this variant in the UK.2 7-9 
This association is not necessarily as strong in other 
countries as variants there can also produce S gene 
negative results.
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WhAt Is AlreAdy knoWn on thIs topIc
The SARS-CoV-2 variant of concern 202012/1, first detected in the south east 
of England in autumn 2020, is more transmissible than previously circulating 
variants
The emergence of this variant coincided with high hospital occupancy, which is 
known to increase mortality
Before this study, unbiased estimates of the mortality of the variant of concern 
were not available
WhAt thIs study Adds
Individuals infected with the variant of concern, identified at UK community test 
centres, were between 32% and 104% (central estimate 64%) more likely to die 
than equivalent individuals infected with previously circulating variants
The absolute risk of death in this largely unvaccinated population remains low, 
but clinicians and public health officials should be aware that a higher mortality 
rate is likely even if practice remains unchanged
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Sequencing of VOC-202012/1 revealed 14 genetic 
mutations, eight of which occurred in parts of the 
genome that code for the spike protein responsible 
for cell binding,10 and which impairs detection of 
the S gene. These mutations seem to have imparted a 
phenotypic change to the cell binding mechanism,2 7-9 11 
with the potential for increased infectivity.12 13 The 
impact of the change on clinical presentation, patient 
outcome, and mortality remains poorly understood.
We used linked data from syndromic community 
testing and death records to assess whether the new 
SARS-CoV-2 variant is associated with a different risk 
of mortality compared with previously circulating 
variants.
Methods
The study primarily set out to determine if mortality 
was different in patients testing positive for SARS-
CoV-2 with PCR test results compatible with those for 
VOC-202012/1 compared with other variants. This 
objective was problematic because during the period 
under study rates of covid-19 cases in the UK increased 
steeply, putting hospital services under strain, which 
in turn affected mortality14 and potentially biased 
observations of mortality.
We conducted a matched cohort study. To deal 
with bias from the varied geographical and temporal 
incidence of covid-19 and its burden on hospitals we 
matched patients closely on time and geographical 
location, and we also assessed the variability of our 
estimates when relaxing the matching criteria.
inclusion criteria
People were eligible for study inclusion if they were 
older than 30 years and had a single positive test 
result for covid-19 from 1 October 2020 to 29 January 
2021. We restricted our sampling to test results that 
reported a PCR cycle threshold value. Antigen swab 
tests in the UK are carried out through two routes: 
pillar 1 represents National Health Service testing of 
healthcare workers and those with a clinical need, and 
pillar 2 represents community testing of people with 
symptoms. Community based covid-19 diagnoses are 
generally in a younger population with less severe 
disease than hospital based covid-19 diagnoses, as 
elderly people or those with severe disease tend to 
present directly to hospital (see supplementary file for 
details). We consider only the subset of pillar 2 tests 
that were processed in the high throughput Lighthouse 
laboratories that employ the Thermo TaqPath covid-19 
multiplex PCR assay, which amplifies the open reading 
frame 1a/b junction (ORF1ab) and the N gene and S 
gene of SARS-CoV-2. We included people with a single 
positive PCR test using the TaqPath assay and with 
available PCR cycle threshold values for the S, N, and 
ORF1ab components of SARS-CoV-2.
Data processing
We classified SARS-CoV-2 positive test results as S gene 
positive (compatible with previous variants) when 
cycle threshold values were: S gene <30, N gene <30, 
and ORF1ab gene <30. We classified test results as S 
gene negative (compatible with VOC-202012/1) when 
cycle threshold values were: S gene not detected, N 
gene <30, and ORF1ab gene <30. Other combinations 
of known cycle threshold values were classified as 
equivocal and excluded from further analysis.
We used a unique study identifier to link the line 
list of positive test result details and line list of death 
details, when relevant. The line list of deaths records 
fatalities in both hospital and community settings 
within 28 days of a positive covid-19 test result, and 
follows the PHE definition of “a death in a person 
with a laboratory-confirmed positive covid-19 test and 
who died within (equal to or less than) 28 days of the 
first positive specimen date.”15 This list is maintained 
by PHE and represents the most timely and complete 
record of deaths due to covid-19 in England.15 The 
deaths line list also contains some details about the 
timing of hospital admission in those people who died. 
Patients who could not be linked and were therefore 
uninformative for S gene status were classified as 
“unknown” and were also excluded; these are generally 
samples not processed in Lighthouse laboratories, and 
include hospital cases.
During the study, hospitals experienced a period 
of intense demand in areas with large outbreaks 
of VOC-202012/01, which potentially could have 
adversely impacted patient outcomes. To control for 
any systematic bias this could have introduced, we 
matched people with S gene positive test results to 
individuals with S gene negative test results (highly 
likely to be VOC-202012/01) with exact matches on 
sex, ethnicity, index of multiple deprivation, location 
(as lower tier local authority region of about 190 000 
people), and close matches on age (five years either 
way), and date of specimen collection (one day either 
way).
Some patients who were S gene negative matched 
multiple people who were S gene positive and vice 
versa, so we sampled participants randomly within 
our framework to generate 50 replicates, ensuring 
no S gene negative or S gene positive participant was 
present more than once in each replicate. All analyses 
were conducted on each replicate as a separate sample 
and the results pooled by combining the β coefficient 
estimates as a mixture of normal distributions and 
calculating combination mean and confidence 
intervals numerically from the mixture distribution 
(see supplementary file for details).
statistical analysis
Participants were followed-up for 28 days after 
infection or until 12 February 2020, after which 
point we censored those with no record of death. 
In these data more than 50% of covid-19 related 
deaths were reported within three days of the date 
of death, and more than 95% within 14 days16 (see 
supplementary file for details). The delay in reporting 
deaths for participants who were S gene negative and 
S gene positive are the same. The deaths line list is 
constructed from multiple sources and is considered to 
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be the gold standard list of covid-19 related mortality 
in England. This list will ultimately include all deaths 
with covid-19 mentioned on the death certificate. We 
compared the rates of death in our community based 
dataset between participants who were S gene positive 
with those who were S gene negative. Using a Cox 
proportional hazards model we calculated the hazard 
ratio of death given an S gene negative test result 
versus death given an S gene positive test result17 with 
age (years) as a linear covariate, taking into account 
censoring. All analyses were performed in R (version 
3.6.3).18-20
sensitivity analyses
We examined different inclusion criteria for sources of 
systematic bias. We systematically adjusted values for 
cycle thresholds for the S, N and ORF1ab genes, and 
the tolerances of our algorithm to match both inexact 
age and inexact specimen dates.
Patient and public involvement
Owing to the nature of this research, no patients or 
members of the public were involved in the design or 
reporting of this study.
results
Overall, 941 518 patients older than 30 had a single 
positive TaqPath test result between 1 October 2020 
and 28 January 2021 (fig 1). From these, 214 082 
people were identified who matched with at least 
one other individual on age, date of specimen 
collection, sex, ethnicity, geographical location, and 
index of multiple deprivation, and differing only by 
S gene status. Sampling these pairs to ensure they 
represented unique people resulted in 50 replicates 
with an average of 54 906 S gene positive people 
and 54 906 S gene negative people in each replicate. 
Every person was followed-up for a minimum of 14 
days after their first positive test result, and more than 
85% of the cases were followed for the whole 28 day 
period (see supplementary file for further details). 
Of these 109 812 participants, 367 died (averaged 
over the 50 replicates) within 28 days of a positive 
covid-19 test result (0.3%) (table 1). The matching 
and sampling process is observed to control well for 
all personal and geographical variables considered 
(with slight mismatches owing to differences in scale 
from matching and reporting). When a tolerance of 
five years was allowed for matching age the average 
difference between study arms was 0.0 years, and 
when a tolerance of one day was allowed for matching 
specimen date a mean difference of 0.2 days was 
observed (with S gene negative specimens taken later 
than S positive specimens).
The subset of participants who died were generally 
older (mean 66.9 v 46.3 years) and a higher proportion 
were men, as has been reported previously.21 Both 
cases and deaths were underrepresented in the south 
west and east of England—these areas had only 
recently used TaqPath assays and thus did not report 
S gene status.
Of the 54 906 participants in the S gene negative 
arm, an average of 227 deaths occurred compared with 
141 of 54 906 in the S gene positive arm (hazard ratio 
1.64, 95% confidence interval 1.32 to 2.04; P<0.001) 
over the study period (table 2). The rate of death 
of S gene negative and S gene positive participants 
diverged after 14 days (fig 2). The proportional hazards 
assumption of the Cox model was therefore violated as 
the hazard ratio was not constant over time. This was 
investigated further (see supplementary file), and the 
violation might be corrected by considering the hazard 
ratio in days 0 to 14 compared with days 15 to 28 of 
follow-up. The hazard ratio in the first period was not 
significantly increased, but in days 15 to 28 the hazard 
ratio was 2.40 (1.66 to 3.47).
The matched cohort design controls for most 
potential biases, including variations in hospital 
capacity, as it pairs patients by personal characteristics, 
geography, and time of testing. Other further potential 
biases that might be present were investigated. One 
possibility for bias could be a difference in the timing 
of presentation of S gene negative and S gene positive 
people for testing, with, for example, S gene positive 
people presenting earlier, and thus seeming to progress 
slower. Hospital admission data were only available 
for patients who ultimately died, but there was no 
evidence for asymmetrical delays in time from test 
to hospital admission (fig 3). The Office for National 
Statistics also investigated this and found that S gene 
negative patients are more likely to present earlier for 
testing.22
The paired cases in this study were spread over time 
but concentrated around the end of December 2020 
and beginning of January 2021 (fig 3). As the ratio of 
S gene negativity to S gene positivity changed over this 
period, in the early stages it was comparatively difficult 
to match S gene negative people with S gene positive 
equivalents, and in the later stages it was difficult to 
match S gene positive people with S gene negative 
equivalents, with the bulk of matching occurring 
during the time of transition from dominance of the 
S gene positive variant to dominance of the S gene 
negative variant (see supplementary file).
Cycle threshold values for the N gene were lower 
in participants who were S gene negative than in 
those who were S gene positive, and this effect was 
potentiated in those who died (table 1 and fig 3). Low 
values for the N gene cycle threshold implied that the 
viral load in participants at the time of sampling was 
higher. The higher mortality could be associated with 
the higher viral load in S gene negative participants 
because of the intrinsic properties of the VOC202012/1 
mutation. Alternatively, it could be an indication of 
the timing of testing, with people who were S gene 
negative presenting at peak infectiousness, for some as 
yet unknown reason. Thus, cycle threshold values for 
the N gene could be regarded either as an indication of 
bias or as a feature of S gene negative infection. If this 
is interpreted as a source of bias, the Cox proportional 
hazards model can control for the N gene cycled 
threshold value (table 2, second model), which for S 
 on 12 M










J: first published as 10.1136/bm






4 doi: 10.1136/bmj.n579 | BMJ 2021;372:n579 | the bmj
gene negativity showed a hazard ratio of 1.37 (95% 
confidence interval 1.09 to 1.72). Even if increased 
viral load as a biological feature of S gene negative 
infection is not considered, the residual increase in 
hazard ratio implies a mortality effect not explained by 
viral load alone.
sensitivity analysis
The cut-off value of cycle threshold used in definition 
of gene positivity mildly affects the central estimate of 
the hazard ratio, such that when the cycle threshold 
value for identifying a particular gene was reduced, 
the central estimate of hazard ratios was observed to 
decrease (fig 4). Lower cycle threshold values were 
associated with a reduction in the number of certain 
S gene positive and S gene negative results and an 
increase in the number of equivocal results, which 
were subsequently excluded from analysis, resulting in 
an effective reduction in overall case numbers. Given 
that cycle threshold values were generally higher in 
patients with S gene positivity, as defined at the cycle 
threshold value of less than 30, further reductions 
in the cut-off value of the cycle threshold tend to be 
associated with a reclassification of S gene positive 
Cycle thresholds: S gene ≤30; N gene ≤30: ORF ≤30
469 714 (50.1%) positive for S gene
394 943 (42.1%) negative for S gene
73 649 (7.8%) with equivocal S gene status
Matching
Unique pairs selected by random sampling without replacement in 50 replicates
Cases in over 30s (1 Oct 2020 to 28 Jan 2021)
Excluded cases with unknown
S gene status (50.8%)
69
S gene negative
227 patients died within 28 days and 54 680
survived for 28 days (or until 12 Feb 2021)
Cases with known S gene status
Excluded
Missing index of multiple deprivation
Missing or unknown sex
Unknown age
Unknown ethnicity
Admitted before pillar 2 test taken
Reporting delay <0 or >19 days
S gene <0 or >19 days aer first test













Excluded cases with equivocal result
941 518








141 patients died within 28 days and 54 765
survived for 28 days (or until 12 Feb 2021)
54 906
Fig 1 | sample selection algorithm showing average figures for numbers of participants in each study arm. Matching 
involved random sampling to create 50 replicates. some cases were excluded for more than one reason
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rather than S gene negative patients with more mild 
disease as equivocal. This could explain the small 
reduction in hazard ratio associated with reducing the 
cut-off value of the cycle threshold. A marginal, non-
significant increase was observed at a cycle threshold 
cut-off value of 30; as most laboratories use this as a 
standard cycle threshold cut-off value, this was chosen 
as the central estimate.
When matching patients for the cohort, allowing 
larger mismatching led to small changes in the 
associated hazard ratio estimate. The effect of 
mismatching on age between S gene negative and S 
gene positive participants did not create a systematic 
bias, and the mean age difference between both 
study arms was less than 0.005 years (fig 4). Age 
was observed to be a strong predictor of mortality in 
covid-19, so some potential bias might be expected; 
this is controlled for by including age as a covariate in 
the calculation of hazard ratios (table 2).
A dilution of hazard ratios was observed when a 
greater degree of mismatching was allowed between 
sample dates in S gene positive patients matched to S 
gene negative patients (fig 4). Because of the change in 
prevalence over the study period from predominantly 
S gene positive to predominantly S gene negative, 
increasing the degree of mismatching of sample date 
was associated with a systematic pairwise bias in the 
dates of the original positive test result (fig 4), with S 
gene negative patients generally being identified after S 
gene positive patients. Given that over the study period 
the number of cases was observed to exponentially 
increase, this could have affected the overall result 
as hospital capacity generally worsened during the 
study period. To avoid this the study minimised the 
sample date tolerance, trading off the reduction in 
bias against the variance introduced by the reduced 
number of cases resulting from tight matching 
criteria.
table 1 | Matched s gene positive and s gene negative participants. values are numbers (percentages) unless stated 
otherwise
characteristics s gene positive (n=54 906) s gene negative (n=54 906) Death (n=367)
Mean (SD) age (years) 46.3 (11.0) 46.3 (11.0) 66.9 (14.1)
Age category:
 30-59 48 486 (88.3) 48 486 (88.3) 114 (31.0)
 60-69 4973 (9.1) 4973 (9.1) 96 (26.1)
 70-79 1175 (2.1) 1175 (2.1) 89 (24.2)
 ≥80 273 (0.5) 273 (0.5) 69 (18.8)
Ethnicity:
 White 45 698 (83.2) 45 698 (83.2) 325 (88.3)
 Asian 6930 (12.6) 6930 (12.6) 38 (10.3)
 Other 1167 (2.1) 1167 (2.1) 1 (0.3)
 Unknown 127 (0.2) 127 (0.2)
 Afro-Caribbean 985 (1.8) 985 (1.8) 4 (1.1)
Sex:
 Women 29 378 (53.5) 29 378 (53.5) 141 (38.3)
 Men 25528 (46.5) 25 528 (46.5) 227 (61.7)
Index of multiple deprivation 10th:
 1st 5005 (9.1) 5005 (9.1) 26 (7.0)
 2nd 9413 (17.1) 9413 (17.1) 93 (25.0)
 3rd 7262 (13.2) 7262 (13.2) 65 (17.5)
 4th 6241 (11.4) 6241 (11.4) 34 (9.1)
 5th 5344 (9.7) 5344 (9.7) 36 (9.7)
 6th 4402 (8.0) 4402 (8.0) 31 (8.3)
 7th 4421 (8.1) 4421 (8.1) 24 (6.5)
 8th 4336 (7.9) 4336 (7.9) 26 (7.0)
 9th 4364 (7.9) 4364 (7.9) 20 (5.4)
 10th 4123 (7.5) 4123 (7.5) 17 (4.6)
Mean (SD) N gene cycle threshold 21.3 (4.2) 19.0 (4.4) 18.3 (4.3)
Region:
 East of England 3634 (6.6) 3637 (6.6) 18 (4.9)
 London 8874 (16.2) 8874 (16.2) 26 (7.0)
 Midlands 10 550 (19.2) 10 563 (19.2) 88 (23.7)
 North East and Yorkshire 10 733 (19.5) 10 740 (19.6) 83 (22.4)
 North West 14 711 (26.8) 14 693 (26.8) 123 (33.2)
 South East 5105 (9.3) 5106 (9.3) 22 (5.9)
 South West 1301 (2.4) 1297 (2.4) 11 (3.0)
S gene:
 Positive 54 906 (100.0) 141 (38.3)
 Negative 54 906 (100.0) 227 (61.7)
Status:
  Dead <28 days of positive  
covid-19 result 141 (0.3) 227 (0.4) 367 (100.0)
  Survived 28 days or until  
12 Feb 2020 54 765 (99.7) 54 680 (99.6)
Participants were matched on age, ethnicity, sex, index of multiple deprivation, geography, and specimen date (not shown).
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Despite the differences between the combinations 
investigated, all studies reported a statistically 
significant increase in the risk of mortality associated 
with VOC-202012/1, suggesting a real effect, and 
most central estimates were within the range of 1.5 to 
1.7. The supplementary file discusses other potential 
covariates.
discussion
Infections with the new variant VOC-202012/1 (as 
measured by S gene negativity) were associated with 
an increased risk of death (P<0.001) in people testing 
positive for covid-19 in the community. The increased 
hazard ratio between 1.32 and 2.04, higher than for 
other variants, translates to a 32% to 104% increased 
risk of death, with the most probable hazard ratio 
estimate of 1.64, or a 64% increased risk of death. 
The absolute risk of death in this group of community 
identified participants, however, remains relatively 
low, increasing from 2.5 to 4.1 deaths per 1000 cases.
We controlled for several biases when using a 
matched cohort approach. In particular, mortality is 
affected by how many patients require intensive care 
in a hospital setting14; increasing numbers of patients 
in the study period (1 October 2020 to 12 February 
2021), compounded by staff absenteeism as a result of 
covid-19 infection or isolation because of contact with 
infected people, has placed intense strain on hospital 
services and a reduction in the staff to patient ratio. 
Staff absenteeism might have affected mortality and 
is a potential source of bias. We controlled for this by 
matching patients on administrative region and time of 
positive test result (within one day), which constrains 
pairs to receive care at the same place and time, and we 
suggest at a similar level of care. Although age related 
mortality is controlled for by matching on age (within 
five years), it is also controlled for by using the Cox 
proportional hazards model.
As this was a community based study, we do not 
have information on the S gene status of patients in 
hospitals. The community based testing (pillar 2) in 
this dataset covered a younger age group and hence 
represented less severe disease than patients detected 
through hospital based testing (pillar 1). Death 
remains a comparatively rare outcome in patients 
detected in the community compared with identified 
in-hospital deaths. Our study only includes about 
8% of the total deaths that occurred during the study 
period. Of all coronavirus deaths, about 26% occurred 
in those who were identified in the community, and 
data on S gene status was only available for 30%.23 
Whether the increase in mortality from community 
based testing is also observed in elderly patients or in 
patients admitted to hospital remains to be seen.
We cannot exclude a selection bias. Community 
testing is largely self-selected, or driven by contact 
tracing. A potential bias remains if a higher proportion 
of patients with S gene negative infections without 
symptoms were undetected than patients with S gene 
positive infections. In this event, patients infected with 
VOC-202012/1 might be at a more advanced stage of 
disease when identified and have a higher apparent 
mortality. This could be consistent with the lower N 
gene cycle threshold values observed in S gene negative 
participants. Our analysis, or any retrospective study 
based on patients with symptoms, would not be able 
to detect this; however, early survey data suggest that 
people with S gene negative infections are, if anything, 
more likely to present for testing.22 Dealing with this 
potential bias requires a study design capable of 
detecting asymptomatic infections in participants who 
are negative or positive for the S gene.
Some of the increased risk could be explained by 
comorbidities. Information was not available about 
comorbid conditions in the data we analysed, although 
this would be partly controlled for by matching on age, 
ethnicity, and index of multiple deprivation. Currently 
there is no evidence of a mechanistic reason why people 
with certain comorbidities would be infected with one 
variant and not another. It is possible, however, that 
people with certain comorbidities are at a higher risk 
of infection with VOC-202012/1 and have a higher 
mortality rate. This would tend to reduce the hazard 
ratio attributable to VOC-202012/1 alone.
Our preliminary estimate of the hazard ratio was 
1.91 (95% confidence interval 1.35 to 2.71), which 
is marginally higher than the estimate presented here 
table 2 | risk of death in s gene negative compared with s gene positive (reference 
category) participants
Model, predictor, value Hazard ratio (95% ci) P value
s gene+age
S gene status:
 Positive (ref) — —
 Negative 1.64 (1.32 to 2.04) <0.001
 Age (per decade) 3.55 (3.28 to 3.84) <0.001
s gene+n gene cycle threshold+age
S gene status:
 Positive (ref) — —
 Negative 1.37 (1.09 to 1.72) 0.004
 Age (per decade) 3.51 (3.24 to 3.80) <0.001
 N gene cycle threshold (per 10 units) 0.50 (0.39 to 0.65) <0.001
Hazard ratios >1 are indicative of an increased rate of death in people with infections compatible with VOC-
202012/01. In the first model the S gene status is assessed as an indicator with age as a covariate, in the 
second model variability is included in the N gene cycle threshold value measured in the original specimen as a 
continuous predictor.

















0 147 21 28
S gene positive
S gene negative
Fig 2 | Kaplan-Meier survival curve for s gene positive (previously circulating variants) 
and s gene negative (new variant vOc-202012/1) participants in the uK. the y axis has 
been truncated as mortality was low in both groups
 on 12 M










J: first published as 10.1136/bm






the bmj | BMJ 2021;372:n579 | doi: 10.1136/bmj.n579 7
with compatible uncertainty.23 24 This was based on 94 
deaths in S gene negative patients and 49 deaths in S 
gene positive patients in 66 208 less strictly matched 
pairs, with a shorter study period, and limited follow-
up. As the new variant outbreak has unfolded and 
more data have become available, we have been able 
to obtain more accurate central estimates by narrowing 
the tolerance for mismatches, extending the study 
period and increasing the proportion of patients 
with complete follow-up. The design of this study is 
well suited to determining, in an unbiased manner, 
whether the risk of death has increased, although we 
studied a comparatively small number of patients. 
Other study designs, involving the use of unpaired 
samples, might be better able to quantify the absolute 
increase in risk, albeit with more potential for bias.25 
Other recent studies produced similar estimates of the 
increased hazard ratio. Although these studies use the 
same community based testing data, they had different 
study and analysis designs. The preliminary results of 
these studies were compatible point estimates of the 
mortality hazard ratio (1.3 to 1.65), and the confidence 
intervals of these studies overlap with those described 
here.23 As with our work, these other estimates are 
being continuously re-evaluated as more data are 
acquired; and in subsequent updates some of these 
have been revised upwards.26
conclusions
The variant of concern, in addition to being more 
transmissible, seems to be more lethal. We expect 
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properties because of multiple genetic mutations,27 
and we see no reason why this finding would be 
specific to the UK. This development, borne out in 
epidemiological analyses, implies that the rate of 
patients with serious infection requiring hospital 
attention will increase. At the time of writing (15 
February 2021) the national lockdown appears to be 
effective at reducing the transmission rate of SARS-
CoV-2 in the UK, but proliferation of the new variant has 
made it more difficult to control the covid-19 outbreak. 
The resulting number of deaths will scale linearly with 
the proportion of people infected with the new variant. 
Other analyses have indicated that the new variant is 
also associated with increased transmissibility, which 
would lead to a potentially exponential increase in the 
resulting number of deaths.12 Clinicians at the front 
line should be aware that a higher mortality rate is 
likely even if quality of practice remains unchanged. 
This has broader implications for any vaccination 
allocation policy designed to reduce mortality in the 
late middle age groups, typical of the community 
identified patients in this dataset.
The question remains whether excess mortality 
due to VOC-202012/1 will be observed in other 
population groups, particularly elderly people, care 
home residents, and those with other comorbidities 
who generally present directly to hospital as 
an emergency. Hospital based studies require a 
mechanism to distinguish emerging variants from 
previously circulating variants, currently only done 
through genotyping. Owing to the effort involved, the 
proportion of genotyped samples representing patients 
admitted to hospital remains low, and we recommend 
that PCR tests that specifically target VOC-202012/1 
mutations should be more widely used.
Moreover, the emergence of VOC-202012/1 and its 
mutations (including E484K), combined with other 
variants of concern, including those identified in Brazil 
and South Africa,28 highlights the capacity of SARS-
CoV-2 to rapidly evolve new phenotypic variants, with 
mutants that evade vaccines being a real possibility.29 
Our study has helped to characterise the clinical 
presentation and outcome of one new variant, but given 
sufficient amounts of informative data our findings can 
be generalisable to other variants. Assessment of the 
clinical outcomes of multiple circulating phenotypic 
variants, however, requires scalable technology that is 
capable of identifying substantial numbers of patients 
infected with emerging variants (eg, broad PCR assay 
panels targeting variant foci30) and robust collection of 
outcome data.
In this study we controlled for the effect of time, 
geographical location, age, sex, ethnicity, and 
deprivation, but these are important factors to 
understand if future outcomes are to improve. Future 
work on the relative impact of these might allow for 
better targeting of resource allocation,31 vaccine 
distribution strategies, and relaxation of restrictions.
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